The Golden Age of Reasoning: Rambam and Zhuxi1
By Tiberiu Weisz2

How did two philosophers, one Jewish and one Chinese, come to the rescue of their cultures at a time when Judaism was under Arab cultural pressure during the height of Islam, and at the same time China was on the verge of losing the native Confucianism to Buddhism?

It fell on the Jewish and Chinese philosophers of the Middle Ages to turn back the tide and return to their roots. As much as the Bible and the Classics unified the people, they also contributed to their isolation. Instead of keeping pace with the outside world, the Jews and the Chinese immersed themselves in the study of their canons, setting themselves apart from other civilizations. Outward manifestations became especially noticeable in manner of dress and conduct. The Jews wore distinctive black robes with headdresses that set them apart from other people. The Chinese, by nature of their appearance, stood in stark contrast to other cultures. It became easy to distinguish a Chinese or a Jew in any environment.

In addition, Jewish and Chinese sages instilled a false sense of superiority in their followers that was resented by outsiders. Outsiders could glimpse the inner workings of Jewish or Chinese customs, but they could not participate on equal terms unless they went through the lengthy process of conversion or sinicization. Bookish learning became the primary focus of both Chinese and Jewish culture, often making them appear to be aloof and above the problems surrounding them.

The Jews withdrew into their own communities, returned to the Talmud to find answers to the challenges posed by the Arab cultural infiltration into Jewish culture. Under the pretext of learning, the Jews ignored events that did not affect them directly. Concentration on learning led them to start questioning every aspect and word of the written and oral laws. Since these laws were universal in nature and applied equally to every Jew in the Diaspora, and since the problems were local in nature, inevitably it raised questions of how to apply the universal Torah to local conditions.

Jews in India, for instance, asked about the laws of the mikveh (ritual bath), while Jews in the Arab Peninsula wanted to know the meaning of certain words and phrases in the Talmud. Others in Europe wanted to know if the messiah had arrived, and so on (Ziv, Ben-Sasson, and Landau 1971, 75). Rote memorization of the scriptures was not enough, and the need for rationalism was more acute than ever before.

The Chinese had also distanced themselves from the outside world, and a return to the fundamental teachings of the Classics dominated the ideological landscape of China in the Middle Ages. O Yangxiu (1007–1072), a Chinese philosopher and the avant-garde of neo-Confucianism, pointed out in his essay "On Fundamentals" (benlun) that

Men have been upholding Confucian ethical principles against Buddhism for years without making any headway among the mass of the people because the whole social and cultural environment is indisposed of Confucianism. Civilization is in such an advanced stage of decay that one cannot hope to reassert Confucian principles without first remaking the society and resurrecting institutions from the hallowed past which are more in harmony with the Confucian ideal (Wright 1959, 34).

Return to the past (fugu) and restore the old order, was O Yangxiu's slogan. He concluded that the rote memorization of the Classicswas not enough to satisfy the changing realities. Buddhism employed reason to destroy reason, and in order to counteract Buddhism, the Classicswere in dire need of rational interpretation.

Unless Jewish and Chinese philosophers could explain their canon rationally, the fate of their heritage was in question. The concept that Elohim took a personal interest in each human being and was capable of changing our destiny according to our actions came under intense scrutiny. Similarly, the Chinese literati scrutinized the Buddhists who employed reason to destroy reason; they needed to come up with explanations to counteract the Buddhist logic. For the Jews, the distinction between knowledge derived from reasoning and knowledge derived from the canons became of primary importance. Equally important was the Chinese need to explain the difference between the mind of men (renxin) and the mind of Dao (daoxin). 3

On both sides of the cultural divide, Jewish and Chinese philosophers re-examined their roots to provide logical explanations to acts that previously were accepted as divine revelations. Several Jewish philosophers, such as Solomon Ibn Gabirol (1020–1070), Saadia Gaon (882–942) and Abraham Ibn Daud (ca. 1100–1180) had advanced theories that provided some answers to these questions, but they failed to capture the attention of the communities. Similarly, Chinese philosophers like Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), Zhang Cai (1020–1077), and the Cheng brothers (Hao 1032–1085 and Yi 1033–1107), the forerunners of Chinese rationalism, provided logical and metaphysical explanations that engaged the Chinese mind. But they were not conclusive enough to sway the mind of the people.

Two outstanding and equally intelligent scholars commanded the attention of their people and put forward persuasive arguments for their traditions. Rabbi Moses Maimonides, better known under his Hebrew acronym Rambam, and Zhuxi in China, towered above all previous medieval philosophers. They developed a systematic and analytical process of thought that appealed to both the common people and the scholars. Neither of them created anything that did not exist in the world of philosophy of the times, but they brilliantly synthesized the thoughts of earlier philosophers.

In the philosophy of nature, they were Aristotelians, grounded in the theories of mechanical causation. In the field of moral values they were Platonic—convinced that there exists an eternal unchanging truth that is complete in itself. But here their ideas diverge. Both Rambam and Zhuxi applied their theories to their respective cultural conditions and created a web of philosophical arguments that influenced their respective cultures into the twentieth century and beyond.

Rabbi Moses Maimonides (1135–1204), called Rambam in Hebrew and Musa Ibn Maymun in Arabic, was born in Cordoba, Spain, at a time when the empire of the Moors was dying. With few islands of tolerance left in the Islamic world, he fled to Cairo, Egypt, where he became the personal court physician to Khalif Salah al-Din (Saladin). But in Judaism, Rambam became known for his contribution to the interpretations of the scriptures. Without authoritative yeshivas left to give definite legal decisions, Maimonides' lofty aim was to codify the entire Talmud to ensure its authority and survival.

He wrote the most comprehensive and vivid literary work explaining some of the mysteries of the Torah. Out of fourteen of his works (Yad Hazaka), two gained more recognition, the Mishneh Torah (Second to the Torah) and the More Nevuchim (Guide to the Perplexed). These works were so profound that even students of today's Judaism cannot consider their Jewish education complete without studying Rambam.

In the introduction to the Mishneh Torah, [Rambam] emphasized that this work consisted of statements clear and convincing and in accordance with the conclusions drawn from all these compilations from the time of Moses … till the compilation of the Talmud. "Hence I [Rambam] have entitled this work Mishneh Torah, for the reason that a person who first reads the Written Law [Torah] and then this compilation, will know from it the Whole Oral Law, without having occasion to consult any other book between them" (Twersky 1972, 40).

The Mishneh Torah was written for the common people; it explained the Torah in simple language and eventually became the heritage of the Kabbalists who used it to somewhat stultify Jewish thought. In contrast to the simplicity of the Mishneh Torah, the Kabbalistic literature was complex and understood by few. In the introduction to the More Nevuchim he wrote, "The first purpose of this treatise is to explain the meaning of certain terms occurring in the book of prophecy…It is not the purpose of this treatise to make it totally understandable to the vulgar or to beginners" (Twersky 1972, 236). The More Nevuchim was directed to the intellectual learned in the tradition of the Torah and Talmud, who used it to clear the way to haskala (enlightenment).

Rambam used reason to elucidate the words of Elohim. His works aimed to change the way of the Talmud, which he considered too wordy and too cumbersome to be of significant use to the common people. Maimonides took it upon himself to revise and collate a comprehensive version of Jewish learning by omitting some of the hairsplitting arguments; he avoided mentioning the names of the debating rabbis and summarized the halakha according to the Talmud.

Furthermore, to smooth the awkward style of the Talmud, Rambam eliminated its incomprehensible division and replaced it with his own, which was more in line with human logic. Chapters such as Baba Kama, Baba Mazia, and Sanhedrin were replaced with Book of Knowledge, Ethics, and Judgments, etc., names that meant something to the people. For him, knowing Elohim was the highest level of achievement—higher than ethical attainment.

He composed these works to reawaken Jewish learning by providing logical explanations of the tenets of the scriptures and the Talmud. He felt that Jews needed to harmonize their faith with the philosophies of the time, and his works enabled intellectuals to adhere to traditional Judaism and at the same time to abide by the strictest standards of reason (Schwarz 1956, 252). His historic function was to restore prophetic Judaism as a spiritual lifeline to the Jews (Dimont, 179), thus linking the dying East and the awakening West.

His opponents accused Rambam of being a transmitter of 'Greek learning' in Arab garb, yet to his credit, he was the first writer to perceive Christianity and Islam as historical extensions of Judaism. He also clearly saw the new pattern of Jewish dispersal and its attendant dangers to the Jews.

Zhuxi (1130–1200) was a native of what today is called Fujian Province. He spent his early years studying with his father, who was a minor official. China was in turmoil; the Jurchen, a semi- nomadic Tungusic tribe ancestral to the Manchus, had just defeated the Song in 1126 CE and established the Jin Dynasty, also known as the Northern Song Dynasty.4 Those events left a deep impression on Zhuxi, who, by age ten, displayed his disgust with the "surrendering mentality" of the court.

Although Zhuxi's writing at the time reflected his naïveté, his brilliant thinking caught the attention of the examiner who remarked on his cheng liang (master) examination paper, "I received an [exam] paper from a housheng [member of the younger generation]. 5The entire three sections of the essay dealt with [practical] measures to improve the affairs of the court. He will be an extraordinary man in the days to come" (Zhang and You, 289).

At age nineteen, Zhuxi received the jinshi (doctorate) degree and was appointed District Keeper of Records. For a short period of time, he served in various official capacities, but because of his outspokenness, he was dismissed from each position.

Zhuxi's opponents mounted a massive effort to discredit him by calling his teaching "Dao learning," which, at the time, connoted "false theory." One of his critics went even further; he memorialized the emperor, accusing Zhuxi of treason and asking for capital punishment. Subsequently, Zhuxi was stripped of all his official titles and dismissed from public service, and he retired to a surrounding where, "he wore enough clothing to keep him warm, ate just enough to prevent starvation, and lived in a house just well enough built to protect him from the wind and rain" (Chang, 253).

Though Zhuxi's teaching was not appreciated in his own time, Emperor Renzong of the Mongol Dynasty (1279–1368), who ascended the throne in 1311, was so impressed by Zhuxi's commentary of the Four Books (the Analects of Confucius, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Book of Mencius) that he required it to be an integral part of the examination system. From 1313 until the abolition of the examination in 1905, Zhuxi's commentary became the standard guide for scholars and officials, and it became the official commentary on the Classics.

In 1712, Xuanhua, the chief examiner in support of the inclusion of Zhuxi's commentary in the examinations, wrote a memorial to Emperor Kangxi pointing out that

only Zhuxi's commentary to the Classics … clearly proves that he attained the golden mean of rationalism [li]. Now five hundred years later, his "word by word and sentence by sentence" commentary is still undoubtedly unsurpassed. Look at this, [his works] benefited the prose and other meritorious masterpieces. I know his works thoroughly and do not know of anyone whose words deserve to better praise than that of Zhuxi. He [comes] after Confucius and Mencius (Zhang and You, 347).

The Emperor was so impressed by this recommendation that he warned the candidates "dare not say anything without Zhuxi commentaries [to the Classics] and dare not act without his ethics" (ibid, 347). Anyone who diverged from Zhuxi was considered a usurper of the Classics. Zhuxi was elevated to the status of a saint.

Zhuxi wrote one hundred and forty books, the majority, seventy-two of them, devoted to the elucidation of the Four Books. His works were written in clear, concise language and became the official interpretation of the Classics. His "word by word, sentence by sentence" commentary was comparable in style and depth to the oral and written style of Rashi—the French-born Jewish commentator. However, Zhuxi's methodology and reasoning were equal in lucidity and persuasiveness to those of Rambam. Both Rambam and Zhuxi used reason to fight non-native reason: Rambam used active intellect to prove the uniqueness of Judaism, and Zhuxi used li (reason) to refute Buddhism and to elevate Chinese Confucianism.

Zhuxi wrote his treatise out of the conviction that the literati needed to be persuaded and reassured that the return to the ancient orthodoxy had its roots in rationalism. His starting point was similar to that of Maimonides: that at the most fundamental level, the universe consisted of two principles that were in constant motion. One he called li, an incorporeal principle, and the other qi, the corporeal substance, form or mass.

Zhuxi believed that li was the source of heaven and earth and all things and creatures, and that the changes in the universe were in constant movement. Li actually existed before physical form and was the principle of all things; li was the source, and qi(mass) was created out of li. They were inseparable. Before the creation of the world, li existed. If li existed, there was the world. If there had been no li, there would be no world. Since li existed, there was qi in motion, which produced a variety of things. Li is complete and is all things as a whole and in each thing individually.

The relationship between the li in whole and li in the individual is similar to moonlight shining on objects. Each object has its own moonlight, but this moonlight is moonlight as a whole.

The qi is mass, or substance (as opposed to style), in things, which in association with li, gives objects form. Li explains the reality and universality of things; it is incorporeal, one, eternal and unchanging, uniform, constituting the essence of things, and always good, but it does not contain the dichotomy of good and evil, and it does not create things.

Qi explains physical form, individuality, and the transformation of things. It is physical, many, transitory and changeable, unequal in things, constituting their physical substance, involving both good and evil, and it is the agent of creation (Chan, 590).

What Zhuxi called li and qi were tantamount to what Rambam called Elohim and His creation. As he wrote in the Mishneh Torah:

The basic principle of all basic principles and the pillar of all sciences is to realize the there is a First Being who brought everything into being. All existing things, whether celestial, terrestrial, or belonging to an intermediate class, exist only through His true existence … Even if all other beings were nonexistent, He alone would still exist. Their nonexistence would not involve His existence. For all beings are in need of Him; but He is in no need of them … (Twersky, 43–44)

That Elohim is incorporeal rests in the fact that nothing can move itself; hence, everything that moves is moved by something other than itself. And since a finite body cannot have infinite power, and Elohim is infinite and immovable, His powers are not affected by time. Elohim is the eternal cause of the eternal motion. The existence of Elohim is neither derived nor dependent from elsewhere. Since He is incorporeal and He created the corporeal, He cannot be of the corporeal kind. There exist many bodies, and heaven and earth are finite in magnitude, but reason (Zhuxi's li) dictates that there is only one infinite, incorporeal principle, and that is Elohim. Elohim possesses the attributes of life, power, and wisdom simultaneously, while reason would dictate that one is prior to the other.

That the Holy One in Judaism is not physical body is explicitly set forth in the Torah and in the prophets: "[Know therefore] that the Lord, He is God in Heaven above, and upon Earth beneath" (Deut. 4:39)—and a physical body cannot be in two places at one time. Furthermore, it is said, "For you saw no manner of similitude" (Deut. 4:15); and again it is said, "To whom then will you compare Me that I should be like him?" (Isa. 40:25). If God were body, He would be like all other bodies (Twersky 1972, 44).

Four things must be removed from Elohim: 1) corporeality 2) affections 3) potentiality and 4) resemblance to His creatures. The true attributes of God are negative ones. God cannot have positive attributes because He has no essence different from His existence. Negative attributes are of values that lead us to knowledge of God, because in negation, no plurality is involved. Incorporeal is negative; eternal signifies "not caused" (Husik, 264–265).

How do we know that Elohim and li exist? Both Rambam and Zhuxi set out to prove the incorporeality of the One. Maimonides' argument was not necessarily original. His ideas had already been expressed by earlier philosophers, but his addition of the element of motion made his argument more scientific. All motion is change and is the realization of potential. Every changeable thing is divisible; hence, every movable thing is divisible. That is, every body is divisible. What is not divisible is not movable and, hence, cannot be a body.

Motion and time were the principal elements in the creation of the world. A composite of prime matter (no matter before) and form is eternal; so are time and motion. Motion is not subject to the beginning and end. Everything that comes into being after a state of nonexistence requires motion to precede it, namely the actualization from nonbeing. A body moving another must itself be in motion at the same time.

Being in a body as either an accident or consisting of the essence of the body implies a natural form; therefore, a body has corporeal powers. Whatever is incorporeal cannot be subject to number, unless it is a corporeal power, in which case the individual powers are numbered with their matters or bearers. Time and motion are eternal. Hence, there must be a body moving eternally and existing actually (Husik, 254–260).

Zhuxi's argument was also based on the work of earlier philosophers, but the reaffirmation that li is not a body and therefore cannot be moved was his addition. The li, the Great Ultimate6 [Taiji], has no physical form but consists of principle in its totality. Before heaven and earth existed, there was assuredly this principle (li). It is the principle that "through movement generates the yang [positive]."  It is also this principle that "through tranquility generates the yin [negative] … Does the Great Ultimate not split into parts? Fundamentally, there is only one Great Ultimate. This is similar to the fact that there is only one moon in the sky, but when its light is scattered upon the rivers and lakes, it can be seen everywhere. It cannot be said that the moon has been split" (Chan, 638).

The liis one, but its manifestations are demonstrated in thousands of ways. The Taiji is the li of heaven, earth, and all things (Chang, 257–258). Thus for instance:

During a period of fifteen hundred years, the li [principles], as handed down by Yao and Xun [two of the three sage emperors] … and Confucius has never been put to practice for even a single day in the world. But, beyond human intervention, it is eternally there. It is simply what it is, and is eternal and immortal. It cannot perish, even though men have done violence to it during the last fifteen hundred years. The li does not cease to be. What ceases to be is man's practice of it. Li is the same both in the times past and present. Those who follow it succeed, and those who violate it fail … No one can have any achievement without following the li. The ancient sages, being cultivated in the wisest way of the fundamental, could hold the golden mean, and therefore what they did was all entirely good from the beginning to the end. The so-called heroes in modern times have never undergone such cultivation and have moved in the world for only selfish desires (Fung 1966, 303–304).

"The mind of heaven and earth is to produce things," wrote Zhuxi in the opening chapter of A Treatise on Ren. In the production of man and things, they receive the mind of heaven and earth as their mind. The moral qualities of the mind of heaven and earth are four: origination, flourish, advantages and firmness. In the mind of man there are also four moral qualities—namely, benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom—and benevolence embraces all. In their emanation and function, they constitute the feelings of love, respect, being right, and discrimination between right and wrong. "Ren [benevolence]is a man's mind." Both substance and function of the four moral qualities are thus fully presented without mentioning them. Before feelings are aroused, this substance is already existent in its completeness. After feelings are aroused, its function is infinite" (Chan, 593–594).

Knowledge and action always require each other, taught Zhuxi. When one knows something but has not yet acted on it, his knowledge is shallow. After he has experienced it, his knowledge will be increasingly clear, and its character will be different from what it was before. The efforts of both knowledge and action must be exerted to the utmost. As one knows more clearly, he acts more earnestly, and as he acts more earnestly, he knows more clearly. We must know first before we act. That is why the Great Learning first talks of the extension of knowledge, the Doctrine of the Mean puts wisdom ahead of humanity and courage (ch.20), and Confucius (Analects 15:32) first of all spoke of knowledge being sufficient to attain its objective (Chan, 609). Zhuxi wrote in the Commentary on the Great Learning (ch 5),

There is no intelligence [utterly] lacking knowledge, and no single thing in the world without li. But because the investigation of li is not exhaustive, in some way it is not complete. This is why the first instruction of the Great Learning is that the student must proceed to further gain exhaustive knowledge of those [with which he is not familiar], thus striving to extend his knowledge to the farthest point. When one has exerted oneself for a long time, finally one morning, a complete understanding will open before one (Fung, 306).

He used this argument to reject completely the notion of sudden enlightenment in Buddhism. Sudden enlightenment rejects the notion of the condition of the mind, which is to feel and know, to be intelligent, or is a motive of desire. What Buddhism called mind was the innermost consciousness only, which has nothing to do with the external world. Man on the transcendental level is endowed with the principle called li, which enables him instinctively to know love, sense of duty, decency, and wisdom. On a natural level, the mind can feel, understand and discriminate between right and wrong.

Man is born in a state of calmness. This is his nature from heaven. When man is stimulated and moved by external things, this is desire arising from nature … When man is born with proper means conferred on him by heaven, he is perfectly equipped with all kinds of li. But this is prior to the stage when he becomes subject to stimulation. Beside his nature, a man is physical body. Since he has a body and a mind, he cannot help but receive sensations from the external world (Chang, 272–273).

Confucian rationalism derived from three basic Confucian attitudes:

The "investigation of things" was more properly the examination of moral problems than an inquiry associated with the natural sciences. For Zhuxi, who stressed objective learning, the directive to investigate things was carried out mainly through scriptural and historical studies, and to a lesser extent, in the study of contemporary social problems. Zhuxi remained true to Confucius's primary concern with the relation between self-cultivation (learning) and social order, and devoted little attention to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.

"A young man when at home, should be filial, when away from home, respectful to his elders … when all that is done, if he has energy to spare, to pursue learning" (Analects, I,6). The Great Learning speaks of the investigation of things but not the investigation of li. The reason is that to investigate li is like clutching at emptiness in which there is nothing to catch. When we speak of the investigation of things, it means that we should seek "what is above mass" through "what is within mass." Li is abstract, and things are concrete. We investigate the abstract through the concrete.

Man's nature, according to Zhuxi, is his li—the Supreme Ultimate (taiji). The li of all men is constant, but unfortunately, their qi (substance) is not. If one's qi is impure, one is foolish and degenerate: "If one could but realize that it is human desire that obscures his true nature, he would be enlightened" (Creel, 169).

If institutional change proved so difficult at court, and the idealized government of the Book of Rites seemed unachievable in the circumstances of the time, it was still possible to accomplish some of the social objectives of Confucians through the infiltration, into every household and school, of the Confucian rules of social interaction. Zhuxi had the widest and deepest influence on Chinese society simply through the more intensive application of traditional elements (Wright, 37). The Chinese literati, who by definition comprised a secluded elite, isolated themselves to engage in literary and theoretical debates.

What Zhuxi called mind, Maimonides identified as intellectual apprehension. Both are pure and incorporeal. "Let us make man in our image after our likeness" (Gen. 1:26)—this thought led the Jews to believe that God has a man's form. But the Bible makes it clear that God is bigger that that and forbids the Jews to create an image of Him because the matter of which He is composed is not flesh and blood (Twersky, 246). The image that is referred to here was the specific form, which is intellectual apprehension and not just the shape and configuration.

"Human intellect has objects of apprehension that it is within its power and according to its nature to apprehend," wrote Rambam in the Guide to the Perplexed (Twersky, 252). He based his argument on the nineteenth Psalm, "The heavens are telling the glory of God … day and day pours forth speech, and night to night declares knowledge" (Psm. 19:1–2). That Elohim rules through the angels is evident from both the Bible and the Talmud. "Let us make man in our image" (Gen. 1:26 (italics mine)). "Let us go down and confuse their speech" (Gen. 11:7) is explained in Sanhedrin 38b, Babylonian Talmud: "God never does anything without first looking at the celestial family" (Husik, 268).

The universe consists of a series of ten concentric spheres, each endowed with a soul and moved by intelligence. The tenth sphere he called the Active Intelligence. Through the Active Intellect, knowledge is bestowed on the human mind. At birth it is merely a potency, and we may be said to possess only as much mind as has been actualized through learning and achievement. Life after death is not the continued existence of the human body, its appetites, passions and emotions, but the survival of that portion of the mind that has been actualized. It is this portion that rejoins the Active Intellect and is immortal (Schwarz, 250).

Intellectual pursuits constitute the noblest activity of the soul; the form of the living body leads to virtue. The purpose of human life and activity is to know God as far as it is possible. Good music, beautiful scenery, works of art, etc., should not be pursued for their own sake but because they reflect the work of God.

What Zhuxi called knowledge, Maimonides attributed to wisdom [hokhma]. Wisdom can be applied to acquiring arts, moral virtues, such as in "And teach his elders wisdom" (Psm. 105:22), but it is not the final objective of human cultivation. First and foremost, man should obtain knowledge of the Torah, then obtain wisdom: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, let not man glory in his might; let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him who glories glory in this, that he understands and knows Me" (Jer. 9:23). The greatest perfection in the opinion of the multitude is that of "the rich man in his riches," below him "the mighty man in his might," and below him "the wise man in his wisdom." This last one is the person who possesses the moral virtues; such a person is also held in high esteem by the multitude (Twersky, 356). It is evident that Rambam observed the behavior of the people who regard the attributes of wisdom, wealth, and might that humans try to achieve, and in the process forget that the main objective of the mind is to know Elohim, devoting time to learning His words and discarding the selfishness of people.

A detailed comparative study of Rambam and Zhuxi would consist of several volumes and is beyond the scope of this book. Here, I have briefly highlighted a few common denominators to demonstrate that these two philosophers came to the forefront just in time to save the legacies of their people. Was it a coincidence? First of all, the possibility of any communication between Rambam and Zhuxi was nil; they were unaware of each other, and neither knew anything of the other's culture. That they came to the world stage at the same time was a historical coincidence. Yet the parallelism in their thinking, their analyses, their reasoning, and the commentaries on the origins of their respective canons makes one wonder if destiny was not a factor.

Both the Jews and the Chinese were at a junction in their history where their survival was at stake. For the Jews, the problem was the tangible infiltration of the Arabic culture into the consciousness of the Jews. The Arabs almost succeeded where the Christian had failed. The sagacity of the Arab intellectual life so fascinated Jewish philosophers that they almost forgot their own heritage. The expansiveness of Arab culture attracted even Rambam, who expressed himself in Arabic. Had it not been for the translation of his works into Hebrew, the Jews would have been unaware of the depth of Arabic influence. They would have immersed themselves deeper into the Arabic culture and integrated further into the local surroundings.

That was what happened to the Chinese Jews; for centuries, the Jews in China were isolated, and in the belief that they were the last remnants of their faith, they struggled to maintain their unique way of life.7 By the time the community was brought to the attention of the West, they identified themselves with the Muslims.

For the Chinese, the problem was that Buddhism had already infiltrated their consciousness; it was part of everyday life, and they could no longer distinguish between Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. Buddhist icons were displayed in homes, at official sites, and in the homes of lower-class people, literati and officials—and even in the imperial palace. High-ranking officials and common people alike adopted the Buddhist way of meditation and often left their families to become monks. Admittedly, even Zhuxi was a devout Buddhist; only his high intelligence and penetrating mind made him realize that Buddhism and Confucianism did not mix.

Beneath the antagonism and mutual exclusiveness, there existed a passive awareness of intellectual endeavor. It allowed the Jews and the Chinese to reflect upon their past and future. For the Chinese, the past was enshrined in the Liji8 and served as an indicator of how to solve present and future problems. For the Jews, the past was not conductive, the future was unknown, and only the present could be derived from the Torah.

Medieval Jewish and Chinese philosophers had used reason to try to explain the dangers inherent in assimilating alien cultures. They had argued that assimilation led to extinction, and only by remaining truthful to their roots could they survive. But these ideas had previously been lost on the people, and it took two exceptionally brilliant thinkers, the Jewish Rambam and the Chinese Zhuxi, to elevate these arguments to new heights.

Neither Rambam nor Zhuxi received appropriate recognition during their lifetimes. Nevertheless, the philosophical discourses in the Guide to the Perplexed caused a revolution in the development of Jewish thought. "The lamp of Elohim is the soul of man, searching all the inward parts" (Prov. 20:27). This by itself made Rambam one of the great teachers of Judaism: he unveiled the internal struggle of rabbinic Judaism. He asserted that the Talmudic scholar is also a philosopher and, as such, required that the leadership of the Jews be in the hands of men learned in the ways of the Torah (Guttmann, 167). As the dark ages of the Inquisition descended on the Jews, Rambam's influence emerged in the eighteenth century as a predominant force in the Haskala (Enlightenment) movement.

Zhuxi had vocal critics too. Opposition first came from the orthodox Confucians who were devoted Buddhists and who questioned some of the philosophical treatises of Zhuxi. Is the mind complete in itself and innate, or does its essence comes from without? Does the correct approach to Dao lie in knowledge? The most damaging criticism of Zhuxi came from idealists of the fifteenth century who called his interpretation of Confucianism "fragmented and isolated details and broken pieces" (Chan, 654). These critics pointed out that the Confucians were no longer guardians of the tradition and the examinations were no longer an avenue for serving the people and bringing peace to the world but rather were for personal profit and success.

Despite this opposition, three subsequent dynasties, the Yuan, Ming, and Qing, over a period of more than six hundred years (1279–1912) adopted Zhuxi's rationalism (lixue) as the standard textbook for officials and the standard for the examination system.

Notes

1. The present article is based on Chapter 5 of the book The Covenant and the Mandate of Heaven and is given to Sephardic Horizons for a one-time publication with permission of the author granted on April 8, 2014.

2. Tiberiu Weisz has a Masters Degree in Chinese and is a scholar of China and Judaism. He is the author of two books, The Kaifeng Stone Inscriptions (iUniverse 2006) and The Covenant and the Mandate of Heaven: An In-depth Comparative Cultural Study of Judaism and China (iUniverse 2008), and his articles have been published in magazines in the US, Europe, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Israel. He taught Classical and Modern Chinese and translated academic papers, business and legal documents and other writings from Chinese.

3. Dao is an indefinable term just like Elohim in Judaism. Zhuxi used the term daoxin in the sense of  ‘rational thinking'.

4. After 1126 CE, China was divided into the Northern Song (Jin Dynasty) and Southern Song dynasties (1126–1268). This is important from a Jewish point of view. With the split of the Song Dynasty in 1126, Kaifeng was no longer the capital of the Song.  Kaifeng became the capital of the Jin Dynasty, technically a non-Chinese dynasty. It follows then that the first Jewish temple in Kaifeng was built in the Jin Dynasty in 1163 and not the Song as widely and commonly reported. 

5. Housheng is an expression of admiration by a member of the older generation in reference to a member of the younger generation that is to be respected, as that person has the potential of surpassing his predecessors.

6. This term was originally used by Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), but Zhuxi elucidated this concept in cultural context.  

7. For details, see my translation of The Kaifeng Stone Inscriptions (iUniverse 2006).

8. Liji, The Book of Rites, is the Chinese equivalent to the Torah. It consists of Five Books: The Book of Songs, The Book of History, the Book of Changes, The Annals of Spring and Autumn and the Annals of Zuo.  For detailed comparison between the Liji and the Torah, see The Covenant and the Mandate of Heaven.

Bibliography

Chan, Wing-Tsit. A Sourcebook of Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1970.

Chang, Carson. The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, Vol II. London: Vision Press Ltd.  1958.

Dimont, Max I. Jews, God and History. New York: Signet Books. 1962.

Fung, Yulan and Derk, Bodde, ed. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: Free Press 1966.

Husik, Isaak. A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy. Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America. 1958.

Schwartz, Leo. W., ed. Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People. New York: Random House. 1956.

Twersky, Isadore. A Maimonides Reader. New York: Berman House, Inc. 1972.

Wright, Arthur F, and David S. Nivinson, eds. Confucianism in Action. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1959.

Zhang, Liwen and You Mingzhe eds. Zhongguo Gudai Zhuming Zhexuejia Pingzhuan 中国古代著名哲学家评传。(Famous Chinese Philosophers in Ancient China: Critical Biography). Beijing: Jilu Bookstore. No date. (Chinese)

Ziv, Michael, Haim Ben-Sasoon and Jacob Landau. Divrei Hayamin הימים ידבר  (History of the World). Haifa, Israel: Yuval Publishing Ltd. 1971. (Hebrew)

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